


# MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE'S MONITORING COMMITTEE

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## Progress Report I *Land Force Reserve Restructure*



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February 2002


The Honourable Art Eggleton, P.C., M.P.  
Minister of National Defence  
MGen Georges R. Pearkes Building  
101 Colonel by Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2

Dear Minister:

On behalf of the members of the Minister's Monitoring Committee, I am pleased to present our 2002 Report on Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR). In accordance with our mandate to monitor progress with respect to the implementation of change within the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, the Committee has focussed its attention on this issue for the current report.

Yours sincerely,

John A. Fraser  
Chairman



## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>I</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>III</b>
<b>PROGRESS REPORT I.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>ADMINISTRATION .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<i>Decisions .....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Status .....</i>	<i>4</i>
<i>Observations.....</i>	<i>6</i>
<b>MOBILIZATION AND FOOTPRINT IN THE COMMUNITY.....</b>	<b>9</b>
<i>Decisions .....</i>	<i>9</i>
<i>Status .....</i>	<i>10</i>
<i>Observations.....</i>	<i>10</i>
<b>CONDITIONS OF SERVICE .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<i>Decisions .....</i>	<i>11</i>
<i>Status .....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>Observations.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<b>TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<i>Decisions .....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>Status .....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Observations.....</i>	<i>15</i>
<b>CONSULTATION AND MONITORING .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<i>Decisions .....</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Status .....</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Observations.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<b>COMMUNITY FOOTPRINT: DEFINING THE ROLE FOR THE CF RESERVES .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>ANNEX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE AND POLICY STATEMENT.....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>ANNEX B – MMC CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES.....</b>	<b>27</b>



<b>LIST OF PARTICIPANTS.....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>ANNEX C – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .....</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>ANNEX D – BIOGRAPHIES.....</b>	<b>33</b>
<i>The Honourable John A. Fraser.....</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Dr. David J. Bercuson.....</i>	<i>34</i>
<i>Mr. Daniel B. Dewar.....</i>	<i>35</i>
<i>Major General (Ret'd) Reginald W. Lewis.....</i>	<i>36</i>
<i>Sheila-Marie Cook.....</i>	<i>37</i>
<i>Dr. Peter Archambault.....</i>	<i>37</i>

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. The October 6, 2000 Policy Statement by the Minister of National Defence announcing a Government commitment to increasing the size of the Army Reserves to 18,500 was a defining moment in post-Cold War Canadian defence policy.
2. The Committee acknowledges and commends the strong effort being made by the Canadian Army, under the leadership of the Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant General Mike Jeffery, to revitalize the Army Reserves. Accomplishments and ongoing activities include:
  - A major-general has been appointed to manage Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR);
  - Work is continuing to improve the recruitment and enrolment processes;
  - Army Reserve enrolments increased in 2001;
  - The Canadian Army has developed a new training doctrine;
  - Work on mobilization continues; and
  - A form of job protection legislation is being implemented for Reservists called up to serve in emergency situations.
3. A number of challenges remain. Among these are:
  - A need to convince the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces (CF) that the broader public policy aspects of LFRR require a perspective that extends beyond the DND/CF planning cycles;
  - The importance of a longer term resource commitment to enable full implementation of the Government's Policy Statement of October 6, 2000, which commits to expanding the Army Reserves to 18,500 part-time soldiers by 2006;
  - Certain aspects of LFRR will require effort on behalf of elements of the DND/CF other than the Army in order to ensure that the Army Commander has full "corporate" support to expand the Army Reserves; and
  - Accurate and complete information regarding the state of the Reserves is essential to inform Members of the House of Commons and the Senate, the bureaucracy and the public generally in order to establish public participation in reserve restructure and the broader debate on defence policy.
4. In its consultations, the Committee encountered a great deal of support for the Canadian Forces and for the presence of the military within communities both large and small. The strategic importance of the military's "community footprint" across Canada should not be underestimated.





## **PROGRESS REPORT I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

We are pleased to present our first public report on Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR). Strongly supported by the Reserves community, this project was launched by a Government of Canada Policy Statement on 6 October 2000. The policy document stated that recommendations provided by this Committee (the “Fraser Recommendations”), at the request of the Minister of National Defence, were to be the Government’s blueprint for LFRR. LGen Mike Jeffery, by then the Army Commander had, over the previous summer, outlined a “Strategic Plan” to implement the Fraser Recommendations. The Government identified that plan as the first step in their implementation.

In January 2001, we reported the following to the Minister. We repeat it now in this public report to help explain to Canadians the significance behind the Government’s decision to strengthen the Reserves.

[Minister Eggleton’s] commitment to ensure that the many years of effort invested in revitalizing the Army Reserves resulted in what we believe to be a watershed in Canada’s post Cold War defence policy: a clear statement of public policy to serve as the long-term objectives and benchmarks for changes to be made to one of Canada’s most resilient and valuable national institutions - the Militia, or Army Reserve.

[Minister Eggleton’s] policy statement, released 6 October 2000, was a watershed for several reasons. First, it clearly stated that the *raison d’être* of the Reserves is mobilization, ending the lengthy speculation that augmentation of the Regular Force for current operations was its primary mission. Second, it confirmed that a national mobilization plan will be the basis of restructure, thereby remaining consistent with original Government direction and ensuring Canadians that the CF will have the capacity to expand if necessary if strategic warning, which currently envisions little need to expand, fails. Third, it sets out Canada’s unique path among its principal allies in terms of personnel strength: whereas the United States Army Reserves and the United Kingdom’s Territorial Army have been reduced in strength as part of their restructure, the Canadian Army Reserves will expand. Fourth, the policy statement verifies the Government’s position that the “community footprint” concept that characterizes the Army Reserves will be strengthened. Fifth, and perhaps most welcome for the Defence Establishment, [the Minister’s] policy statement leaves no doubt that the status quo is not acceptable: change to the Army Reserves must occur for its own sake and for the sake of Canada’s military capability. To borrow a slogan from the Army Reserves, they are “ready, willing and able” to take on new roles, capabilities and challenges.

It is important for the broader reserves community and the public to understand the rationale for dividing LFRR into two phases. Phase I is a period of stabilization and assessment. Chronic problems in the Army Reserves, including recruiting, retention, enrolment, equipment and funding, are to be addressed during this phase, to be complete by the end of March 2003. Restructuring decisions that may occur during Phase II,



designed to meet Canada's defence requirements of the future, can then proceed on a rational policy compliant basis.

However, the Committee is concerned that, while progress has been made in the administration of the Army Reserves, there remains no acknowledgement by the Department, the CF or even the Army, that this Policy Statement stands distinct from the Strategic Plan. This distinction is significant because, as a departmental document, the latter is only "resourced" for Phase I of LFRR, and does not offer unqualified commitment to carrying through with expansion of the Army Reserves in Phase II. Indeed, that document still refers to personnel levels of 18,500 as an "assumed critical mass". To the contrary, it is not "assumed", for it is policy, and has been so since announced by Minister Collenette on 7 May 1996. This tentative approach to Phase II of LFRR is not consistent with the Policy Statement, which provides the direction and long-term policy requirement for LFRR. It establishes, in other words, the prerequisites for Phase II restructure. These are, in the main:

- Fixing what is "broken" in the workings of the Militia in terms of areas such as administration, recruiting and enrolment;
- An increase in the size of the Militia toward that established in Government policy (18,500 part-time Reservists) to be fully achieved in Phase II of LFRR;
- Development of a force structure based on a national, as opposed to Army, mobilization plan;
- Explanation of new roles and capabilities in "common sense terms";
- Rethinking conditions of service;
- Revisiting SCRR recommendations not accepted by the Department, in light of the new capability requirements alluded to in the VCDS document *Rethinking the Total Force*, released in November 1999; and
- Preservation of the community footprint provided by the Reserves.

Many elements of the Policy Statement, such as work done on a national mobilization plan, direction to the Chief of the Defence Staff on the content of his annual report to Parliament on the state of the Canadian Forces, and review of the role of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, lay outside the authority of the Chief of the Land Staff to implement.

Furthermore, until we receive concrete plans for Phase II of LFRR and other changes to the Army (a project called "Army Transformation"), it is impossible to measure the Army's activity, let alone the CF's and DND's, against the direction of the Policy Statement. Nonetheless, progress has been made in rejuvenating the Army Reserves. While likely the most ambitious and complex component of Minister Eggleton's reform program, it is also potentially a significant success story. Implementation of the Government's Policy Statement on LFRR, issued by Minister Eggleton on 6 October 2000, presented a challenge for the Minister, the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Forces, the larger reserves community and Canadians generally. With long-term public policy objectives and a Phase I implementation plan in place, LFRR is on increasingly solid ground.

The Government of Canada Policy Statement, as enunciated by Minister Eggleton on 6 October 2000, has, we believe, ended the long and unhelpful quarrel over which component of the Army, being Militia or Regular Force, best serves Canada's national interests. The Policy Statement recognizes unequivocally that there is one Canadian Army based on two components – regular and reserve – each of which is essential to providing Canada with strategic defence capabilities. Full-time professionals can be called upon for rapid reaction and deployment for immediate operational needs, whereas Reservists provide the nation with an expansion base, local capability to respond to a wide range of exigencies, and the “footprint” of the military in Canadian communities. Reservists may be called upon also to augment Regular Force deployments when made necessary by Regular Force shortages or by the availability of capabilities not resident in the Regular Force. These three roles (footprint, mobilization and augmentation) are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, it is the “footprint”, or the existence of Militia units across the country, that provides the expansion base and local visibility for the CF in addition to the ability to augment Regular Force units for deployment.

This report provides the Monitoring Committee's observations on progress made over the past year on LFRR. It is not intended to be an authoritative record of the state of the Army Reserves. That is not our mandate. Rather, the Committee is examining LFRR from the same perspective as it does other elements of the Minister's reform program, now several years in the works. We have tried to offer encouragement when appropriate, praise when it is warranted, and caution where future stumbling blocks appear. While recognizing progress made thus far, the Committee is concerned that Phase II of LFRR, and perhaps even Phase I, demands resources not currently in the Army budget. We do not yet know what Phase II will cost and, until a plan for restructure has been accepted by the Minister, costing is notional at best.

Since the outset of the Minister's reform program, the Committee has said repeatedly that strategic change is not accomplished without senior leadership's support, courage and commitment of resources. Given the extent of the CF's current operational deployments and the military's necessary attention to current demands, it becomes even more essential for senior leadership of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to champion reform, lest it be left in the “too hard basket” for a later date.



## ADMINISTRATION

### DECISIONS

**Fraser Recommendation #1:** Steps should be taken and announced to fix chronic problems in the way the reserves system is administered.

- Recruiting: more flexibility and authority to local reserve authorities to design advertising to suit local conditions and needs, and to appeal to local target groups.
  - Enrolment: simplify and shorten the enrolment process. Permit conditional enrolment.
  - Training: establish standards to be achieved for qualification levels, and hold local Commanders responsible for administering them. Permit civil equivalency to be accepted in place of DND courses where possible. Allow more training at unit level and support it with training aids and equipment (including computer-based training). Where centralized training is essential, it should be scheduled in alignment with Reservists availability; courses once set must not be cancelled.
  - Administration: relieve the excess administrative paper burden on local units and their commanding officers.
  - Pay: remove remaining irritants in the pay process.
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### STATUS

Activity has proceeded on the five components of this decision. The CF has decided to consider revamping the whole process of recruiting, enrolment and retention.

For its part, the Army has also reviewed both regular and reserve component training, and has drafted a new training doctrine that lays out a “train to need” philosophy. It is designed to focus on the Class “A” Reservist (one night a week, one weekend a month), and training to levels relevant to that form of service. To that end, the skills and knowledge required of reservists have been fit into three broad categories:

1. Essential: Those required of the part-time reservist to perform occupational duties and domestic operations.
2. Supplemental: Those required of the reservist to be employed full time.
3. Residual: That required of the reservist to transfer to the Regular Force.

The Army will use this new doctrine to address a junior leadership crisis, whereby less than one new infantry, armoured or artillery officer (platoon or troop commander) is being produced per unit per year in the Army Reserves. The Army has argued that RESO (Reserve Entry Scheme for Officers) and MITCP (Militia Individual Training and Career

Profile) in their present form are not up to the task of building up the officer corps affordably. RESO is a training scheme for commissioning that mirrors Regular Force standards, while MITCP offers a modularized training package for Reservists unable to dedicate summers to “phase training.” The new Army Reserve Professional Development Model will produce a commissioned officer trained to the “essential” level of capability in 90 days. By using a full summer, this program could be completed as quickly as one calendar year, but could be performed in blocks within a maximum of four years. RESO will still be open as an entry scheme with up to three summers of training or employment, but Reservists will no longer participate in Regular Force phase training.

#### Activity Related to the Strategic Plan:

1. The Army has established unit recruiting positions.
2. The Army provided a one-time \$10K grant to brigades for advertising.
3. Under the Reserve Force Employment Project and the CF Recruiting and Retention Project, the Director of Reserves and ADM (HR-Mil), respectively, are analyzing a host of policies and practices related to terms of service, including:
  - Liability of Reserve Force members to serve
  - Employment
  - Career Management
  - Items related to the Cadet Instructor Cadre.

Of particular interest is an initiative to “expedite” enrolment, which consists of various steps:

- a) Application
- b) CF Aptitude Test
- c) Medical Screening
- d) Interview
- e) Enhanced Reliability Check
- f) Verification of Former Service (if necessary)
- g) Physical Fitness Test
- h) Selection
- i) Job Offer
- j) Enrolment.

New procedures were developed in the summer of 2001 in order to reduce some of the historical bottlenecks in the enrolment process. In particular, recruiting centers and units can now call on a more flexible approach to physical fitness testing, security checks, interviews, medical evaluations and verification of former service for those affected. Web-based application forms and a National Call Center have also been put in place. On 19 November 2001, the Army Commander proposed to the organization in charge of CF personnel administration, ADM (HR-Mil), further amendments to the enrolment process

to streamline, for example, the medical evaluation step. The Monitoring Committee is unaware of action yet taken on this proposal.

4. The LFRR Project Management Office (PMO) has undertaken a Unit Bureaucracy Study.
5. The Army is satisfied with its command and control.

### OBSERVATIONS

1. There is no question that a great deal of staff work has been carried out in the areas of recruiting, training and enrolment. Indeed, as figures 1 and 2 below demonstrate, the Army Reserve has increased its enrolment substantially, at least in the first two quarters of 2001 (the most recent figures available). It is too soon to determine whether changes to the enrolment process have contributed to this increase, particularly when over 25% of applicants withdraw from it before completion. While effort has been made to improve and accelerate the enrolment process, we continue to receive reports from across the nation that the delay between application and enrolment remains excessive, which does not meet the needs of the Army Reserves. We therefore urge ADM (HR-Mil) to act with dispatch on the Army Commander's 19 November proposal.

Figure 1: Army Reserve Applicants






Figure 2: Army Reserve Enrolments



2. Although a good deal of attention has been paid to the enrolment process, the Committee remains concerned that permission of conditional enrolment (or probationary status for an applicant until necessary paperwork is complete) at the unit level is not being acted on, apparently because it is not possible under the current provisions of the *National Defence Act*. However, as a fundamental component of their leadership positions, unit commanding officers (COs) should have the authority and responsibility to conditionally enroll recruits, and be held accountable for these decisions. There continues to be evidence, both anecdotal and systemic, of many stories of application files taking so long to process that potential recruits give up or lose interest waiting for approval. Basic medical and reliability checks should not be stumbling blocks to getting people into the CF. Innovative, decentralized approaches to these processes can, and should, be allowed and encouraged. This recommendation therefore combines a call for visible “quick fixes” with more subtle references to the necessity to increase the authority of unit commanders to be more commensurate with the responsibility and accountability that will increasingly be expected of them. Permitting conditional enrolment, for instance, will allow unit COs another tool to meet recruiting targets, while acknowledging their responsibility to exercise sound judgement in exercising their authority.
3. In addition, while the “centre” (NDHQ) should administer through regulations, standards and monitoring, unit COs should be given more authority (and funding) to advertise as they see fit. Given that Director General Public Affairs now controls recruitment advertising, and insists that it be carried out congruently for both Regular and Reserve components, many unit COs are frustrated that they cannot run ads in local newspapers, or use other innovative ways to attract people to Brigades or units. The Committee heard this complaint repeatedly during its consultations that led to the Fraser Recommendations. We continue to hear frustration on this score, but also note that opinion is mixed within the Army as to the virtues of centralization.

4. Even with the current centralized approach to advertising, consideration should be given to campaigns specifically for the Reserves. Concurrent advertising for Regular and Reserve positions may be of some corporate benefit, but it must be recognized that the target base for each is fundamentally different. While both seek to serve Canada in some way, career-oriented aspirants are attracted to the Regular Force, while students or others who, for various reasons, desire part-time experience and adventure, whether short or long term, are suited to the Reserve Force. Furthermore, part-time reserve service should be marketed as a desirable vocation in and of itself, not just as a primer for a full-time Regular Force career.
5. The Committee suggests that more unit level responsibility for recruiting and enrolment would allow those tasked to attract candidates (i.e., Units and Brigades) with the means to follow a candidate through to the end of his or her enrolment process. Many argue, furthermore, that Militia recruits are attracted to specific units in their geographic area first and foremost, and therefore advertising should be focussed on units rather than on the CF as a whole. Unit and Brigade COs are probably in the best position to judge what works in their area. We have been advised by United States military officials, for instance, that Commanding Officers of Army Reserve units do everything they can to get potential soldiers into uniform and training as soon as possible (within three days). In Canada, candidates attracted to a local unit or brigade are then put through a lengthier process in a different organization, the CF Recruiting Group (CFRG).
6. The CFRG's mandate is to attract and process Regular Force candidates, but only to process candidates for the Reserves. The CFRG is not tasked to attract candidates to the Reserve Force. This might account for the inadequacy of information provided on the recruiting pages of the DND regarding the Reserves<sup>1</sup>. The site claims, for example, to provide links to career profiles for Regular Force and Reserve Force streams in the Army. However, the Committee was surprised to discover that information provided on the Reserve profile is merely a copy of that for the Regular. At a time when Government policy has called for increasing the size of the Army Reserves, this is a disturbing signal.
7. In our discussions with serving Reservists and Regulars, in addition to the very lively discussions held on the LFRR Open Forum on the Army's Website, we have noted substantial frustration over the roadblocks to implementing "quick fixes" to the philosophy and process of attracting Canadians into the Militia, signing them up and keeping them there (recruitment, enrolment and retention).
8. It is unfortunate that budget constraints have forced the Army to change the RESO program. It offered a common experience for Regular and Reserve Force officer candidates that helped those who participate to form common bonds and to promulgate an Army ethos that spoke to both full-time and part-time soldiers. After the elimination of COTC (Canadian Officer Training Corps) in the late 1960s, RESO

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.recruiting.forces.ca/html/army/careers/career\\_profiles/index.html](http://www.recruiting.forces.ca/html/army/careers/career_profiles/index.html)

was the remaining form of common training for candidates. Furthermore, the Army will lose a source of great pride – Reservists trained alongside their Regular Force counterparts. The Committee is, however, well aware of the Army Commander's challenge: how to deal with the immediate shortage of junior leaders in the Army Reserve without compromising the quality of the leadership necessary to carry units and higher headquarters into the future. Whatever changes to training may occur, Militia officers must be educated, trained and developed professionally to achieve the competency required of leaders beyond stage two of mobilization.

9. Army command and control has been a concern throughout LFRR. Evidence provided to the Committee throughout consultations indicates that ensuring national standards for training, administration, recruiting and enrolment throughout the four Army Areas, supported by adequate funding, remains a challenge.
10. The Committee is pleased to report that the pay system is now satisfactory, and our consultations revealed no systemic obstacles to the delivery of soldiers' pay. In 1998 and 1999, the Committee reported its disappointment that the cost of the revised pay system had been covered by the Reserve budget, contrary to the Government's decision that was being monitored. In recent consultations, we continue to hear that the cost of the current pay system remains a significant burden on brigades. This cost, while perhaps necessary, must be taken into consideration when allocating brigade budgets in order to maximize resources available to meet growth targets.

## **MOBILIZATION AND FOOTPRINT IN THE COMMUNITY**

### **DECISIONS**

**Fraser Recommendation #2:** Acknowledge the legitimacy of Stages 3 and 4 mobilization as a part of the planning process, and the need for the Reserves structure to be able to support it. Prepare a national mobilization plan as the basis for restructuring. This is consistent with the 1994 *White Paper* and SCRR, and would assure reservists they have a role beyond augmentation for current operations.

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**Fraser Recommendation #3:** Outline proposed roles for the reserves in general terms, including some introduction of non-traditional roles. Explain in common-sense terms why these changes are necessary under present and foreseeable conditions. Give assurance that most combat units will be retained even if some changes may be needed to ensure they are of viable size (e.g., "tactical groupings" of some units while retaining their traditional insignia).

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## STATUS

The Army did not meet its objective to complete a mobilization plan by the end of March 2001 but did produce a draft “Mobilization Planning Guide” in March 2001.

The Army has reported that it did not meet its objective to “agree to roles, missions and tasks for the Army of Today” by the end of March 2001, but the LFRR Project Management Office plans to have this item completed by the end of March 2002.

The Army has introduced CIMIC, Movement Control and Postal capability into its Reserve component, while further work on PSYOPS and NBCD is pending. The introduction of new capabilities is encouraging.

## OBSERVATIONS

1. In order to proceed with restructure in a rational and viable way that will stand the test of time, conceptual work on how the defence establishment will provide what Canada needs and expects of its military in all degrees of mobilization is a fundamental responsibility of the Department and the CF – not just the Army. Only then can Canadians and the Government have the information necessary to make informed decisions on Canada’s defence requirements for the future. As the Fraser Report stated, meeting current operational requirements is an important task for the Army Reserves, but it must be done in concert with preserving the framework to expand if necessary. In fact, that framework is what provides the capability for individual augmentation of Regular Force units in addition to unit level domestic operations. Augmentation, or individual reinforcement of under-strength Regular Force units, and mobilization, or expansion of Regular and Reserve units, are complementary, not competitive, activities.
2. Therefore, we applaud work being done by the Army on mobilization. CF Mobilization Planning Doctrine is a useful start as an internal document, and Exercise Defence Planner, a staff college exercise that has been held at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, has been an excellent source of ideas and challenges for those involved. It is unfortunate that Defence Planner was not held in 2001. As the environments proceed with individual plans for mobilization, we eagerly anticipate the national plan that will result. An articulated force structure for the CF for all stages of mobilization should be the product of this plan. Identification of roles, missions and tasks for all Army Reserve units must be the product of mobilization work, the completion of which is necessary well in advance of the onset of Phase II in 2003. Force structure must be derived from mobilization requirements for all four stages.

### Stages of Mobilization

1. Force Generation
2. Force Enhancement
3. Force Expansion
4. National Mobilization

3. We will also monitor the introduction of what have been described as non-traditional roles for the Reserves. To this end, we will be particularly interested in how an invigorated Supplementary Reserve and the Alternative Service Delivery program will support the Primary Reserve in providing civilian skill sets and specialist augmentation. It is also encouraging to see implicit recognition that the development of new capabilities is not primarily a force structure issue, but rather one of personnel management.
4. The Army's business plan for the fiscal year 2001-02 states that:

*Army Transformation remains the Army's top planning priority. There is general agreement on the character of the Army of Tomorrow: a combat-capable, strategically deployable and interoperable force, anchored on modern, medium-weight capabilities with strategic relevance. The process of transitioning the Army to this concept is ongoing, as new capabilities are being fielded and becoming operational. However, final decisions on how Regular and Reserve Components of the Army will be organized, equipped, trained and resourced are yet to be taken. Care must be taken to ensure that the structure of the army of Tomorrow satisfies two imperatives: it must be modern and capable; and it must be affordable and sustainable.<sup>2</sup>*

5. There are other imperatives. The Army's structure must also satisfy mobilization requirements for all four stages, in addition to fulfilling its footprint role. The mobilization and footprint imperatives will cost money, and both defy short-term performance measurement cycles, but that does not diminish their essential utility. While the Army is trying to match its ends with its means, not the case at the moment, attention must be paid by the corporate body of DND and the CF, as well as all levels of Government, to costing and paying for maintaining the Army Reserve footprint across the country, in communities large and small. While many smaller units may face challenges in drawing from changing population bases, the social role of the Reserves in these communities, enunciated in the Government's Policy Statement, is another imperative that must be recognized in DND/CF planning documents.

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

### DECISIONS

**Fraser Recommendation #4:** Acknowledge that NDHQ (i.e., the Regular Force) understands the different nature of reserve service (part-time, voluntary, limited commitment) and will design roles, standards and training regimes that take it into

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<sup>2</sup> Strategic Operations and Resource Direction 2002, Chapter 1, p. 7/18.

account. Consider new terms of engagement for reservists that may be needed to attract persons with developed skills in the civilian economy (e.g., civilian-military co-operation, psychological operations, vehicle maintenance). For this reason, we urge serious and urgent study of alternative terms of service, including those that may require legislative amendment. Revisit those SCRR recommendations which were initially rejected by the Department, such as contractual obligations and job protection legislation.

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### STATUS

The CF has embarked on a Long Term Capability Plan for Human Resources, which includes the Reserve Force Employment Project. It is considering the fundamental differences between Regular and Reserve service. In addition, a review of the occupational classifications of the CF is intended to evaluate current assumptions about conditions of service for the CF as a whole.

In June 2001, Armed Forces Council approved a new Reserve employment framework, which defines two groupings for future reservists: Limited Liability Service (LLS) and Unlimited Liability Service (ULS). This decision bears not only on the Army, but also on all Reservists. These categories will replace the various classes of service now in place, and will determine rates of pay. Those Reservists employed in Unlimited Liability Service, similar to Regular Force conditions, will normally be engaged in operations, either international or domestic. Those employed in normal reserve training, in addition to serving full-time in non-operational roles, will be categorized as subject to only limited liability, and therefore will receive less compensation. This change is scheduled to come into effect by April 2002.

Bill C-42 (the *Public Safety Act*) is at the Second Reading stage at the House of Commons. Proposed amendments to the *National Defence Act* provide for job protection measures for Reservists activated by the Government in an emergency. Reservists mobilized by the Government would be reinstated in their jobs once demobilized.

### OBSERVATIONS

1. The Committee is pleased that action on job protection legislation is being implemented as part of Bill C-42, the *Public Safety Act*. The job protection measures proposed would, however, apply only to Reserve call-ups under the declaration of an “emergency” by the federal government. According to Defence Plan 2001, issued earlier this year by the Department, the estimated Reserve contribution to the Main Contingency Force is over 2000 personnel, and lead time before deployment is inherently unpredictable. Because deployment of the Main Contingency Force is a white paper commitment, but does not require an “emergency” declaration, job protection measures may not always apply to activated Reservists. It therefore remains to be seen whether the CF can develop an “operationalized” Reserves along



the lines of that of the United States Army. The combination of job protection legislation and a support role integral to the full range of US Army operations, provides the means to mobilize the Army Reserves on a large scale. As of 23 January 2002, for instance, fully 23,000 US Army Reserve and National Guard were on Active Duty. The total number of active duty guard and reserve personnel from all services was more than 71,000.

2. Development of imaginative terms of engagement is therefore a requirement particularly relevant for the non-traditional roles being sought through the Army Reserves. Civilians with the skill sets for such capabilities as PSYOPS and CIMIC are usually in great demand. Their tours of duty, terms of service and training regimes will likely be individually distinctive. CIMIC detachments, which have been stood up in Land Force Areas, without requiring restructure, is a good example of the innovative thinking necessary in the future.
3. Regarding changes to terms of service, it is prudent not to lose sight of the ability of the current Army Reserve to augment the Regular Force with individuals. As of November 2001, over 600 reservists were serving in Class "C" positions, effectively as Regular Force soldiers, to fill headquarters or operational shortages. While those Reservists on deployed operations will receive Regular Force rates of pay, the Committee questions why Reservists and Regulars working in the same limited liability environment, such as NDHQ, should be compensated on separate scales. The Committee will examine the possible implications of this change.
4. In January 2001, the VCDS undertook to improve the Supplementary Reserve. The Committee has not yet examined this component of the Reserves in depth, but will undertake to do so.

## TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

### DECISIONS

**Fraser Recommendation #5:** Provide reliable guarantees that the funding and equipment will be forthcoming on a continuing basis to support the new structure, including both "traditional" and "non-traditional" roles. It is important there be no "tricks" in this commitment, which is bound to be scrutinized very closely.

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**Fraser Recommendation #6:** Bring the strength of the Reserves up to the 30,000 level (18,500-20,500 for the Army Reserves) as established in Government policy. Measures taken by implementing the above recommendations should achieve the results-oriented command and control required to attract and retain sufficient numbers of people.

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**Fraser Recommendation #7:** A level One position should be established in the Department and the CF to act as a leader of change in carrying out the above recommendations, to keep the Minister and the CDS advised on progress, and generally to represent the needs, concerns and interests of the Reserves at the highest levels in the Department and the CF.

**Fraser Recommendation #8:** The Chief of the Defence Staff should include a separate section on the Reserves in his annual report on the State of the CF.

### STATUS

A Project Management Office has been set up to manage Army Reserve Modernization. The Project Manager has also recently been named: Major-General Ed Fitch, most recently the Commander of Land Force Western Area. A Project Charter has not yet been approved. At the time of publication, a Level One Action Directive, which would outline high level corporate responsibility for implementing various aspects of the LFRR Strategic Plan, had not been issued. The LFRR Strategic Plan called for issuance of such a directive by the VCDS.

In order to reach the objective of 18,500 part-time Army Reservists, the Army's Strategic Plan provides for the first step of 15,500 by the end of March 2003. The Army was to have reached 14,000 by the end of March 2001, but fell short of this goal. However, a considerable increase in so-called "effective strength" of the Army, comprised of part-time and temporary full-time personnel, numbered 14,688 as of 6 November 2001. The Army has set a recruiting target of 4,000 Reservists for the next fiscal year, the estimated requirement to reach an effective strength of 15,500 by the end of March 2003. Table 1 and 2 below show Reserve Personnel in the CF broken down by Environment, Command and Group. These totals are also presented for class of service (A, B or C) and operations. Class A represents part-time Reservists while other categories relate to various types of full-time employment. The acronyms are defined in Annex C.

Table 1: Summary of Reserve Personnel by Classes of Service, 6 November 01

EC/Comd/Grp	Totals	CI A	CI B	CI C	on Ops
NavRes	3,730	2,514	1,216		
Army	15,326	14,688		638	
ARF	2,172	661	661	38	13
Comms	2,010	1,674	300		36
DGHS	822				
NDHQ PRL	308				
Rangers	3,483	3,483			
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>27,851</b>				

Source: ADM (HR-Mil)

Table 2: Army – C1 A and B for October 2001

LFWA	3,824
LFCA	5,163
SQFT	3,322
LFAA	2,379
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>14,688</b>

Source: ADM (HR-Mil)

**OBSERVATIONS**

1. Throughout its past monitoring activities, this Committee identified a lack of accountability in the command structure regarding the state of the Army Reserves. A lack of public information on personnel strength, the true cost of the Reserves and many administrative mysteries appeared to the Committee to be symptoms of a command and control breakdown. On many issues, such as the guarantee of training days to individual reservists, civilian-military skill equivalency standards and mobilization planning, there seemed to have been work done, but no senior leader held to account for progress. Furthermore, the drifting of restructure away from original government direction led the Committee to the conclusion that the dangerous slide endured by the Army Reserves was not necessarily the fault of any individual in the chain of command, but rather the command structure itself that kept Reservists only on the periphery.<sup>3</sup> In other words, the Army Reserves had been neglected by errors of omission rather than by errors of commission.
2. We remain convinced that the only way to effect an endurable structure is not to repeat the mistakes of past restructuring attempts. Reserve restructure, attempted several times since the Second World War, has never proven resilient because the distinction between public policy and chain of command decision-making has neither been understood nor even acknowledged by principal actors as the prerequisite for change. That lack of understanding led to the unfortunate turn of events surrounding the force structure proposal of April 1999 that effectively stalled progress.
3. The Army Commander has demonstrated his commitment to act as the “leader of change” for the Army Reserves. We are confident this will continue.
4. The appointment of MGen Fitch as project manager, along with the continuation of the Monitoring Committee to monitor and mediate activity for the duration of the two phases of LFRR, established the foundation of trust that was needed to end the impasse in the process. We have not been apprised of how the third prong of the Minister’s approach, the review of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, will be implemented, but will examine the terms of reference for that position. We are also concerned that the recent lengthy delay in honorary appointments and re-appointments has affected unit morale and “community footprint” in many cases. We

<sup>3</sup> To view previous Monitoring Committee reports, visit the Committee’s Website at [www.frasercom.ca](http://www.frasercom.ca).



reported on this in our report to the Minister in May 2001, and steps have since been taken by the CDS to speed up the process. We will continue to monitor this item.

5. We are in receipt of mixed messages regarding Militia funding. Concern has been raised in at least one Area about apparent cuts to Brigade budgets, an act that would stand in contrast to the Minister's announcement of 6 October 2000. We do not as yet possess sufficient information on this matter, but we do make the observation that transparency and uniformity in funding must prevail. As Brigades increase personnel, funding must be forthcoming to accommodate the long-term growth of the Army Reserves. Recruits must be given sufficient and challenging training to be retained by the Army Reserve. In order to ensure retention, the CLS may have to direct dedicated funds to the unit level based on training days necessary to meet growth targets. The Army must also be satisfied that the number of training days allotted to soldiers is sufficient to retain recruits. To that end, study should be made immediately to determine the optimal income required of new recruits in order to consider the Army as competitive part-time employment. Equipment must also be forthcoming to accommodate the roles, missions and tasks of the Army Reserve.
6. The CDS 2001 Annual Report to Parliament on the state of the Canadian Forces did not respond adequately to policy direction. Aside from a recap of the October 2000 Policy Statement on LFRR, the report contains little information on the current state of the Reserves, Militia or otherwise. Furthermore, there is scant evidence of attention being paid to the Supplementary Reserves, or to the Reserves' ability to mobilize militarily for various contingencies. It is of note that the one paragraph dealing with the Militia is under the section entitled "Sustaining Operations", and makes no mention of the Militia's primary mobilization or footprint roles, only that "Members of the Land Force Reserve help us to fill the ranks of Regular Force high readiness units that are committed to operations." This statement raises a number of questions about the state of the CF's long-term planning in the face of what seems to be a punishing "OP Tempo", and also about the lack of information on the true state of the Reserves being put into Parliamentary and public domain.
7. Furthermore, the CDS Report to Parliament suggests that Phase II of LFRR is only "expected to consider" increasing the Army Reserves to 18,500 members and assigning new roles, missions and tasks. As we pointed out in the introduction to this report, this non-committal approach to reaching Government directed personnel levels is not aligned with policy.
8. Army Reserve figures for effective strength are heartening, and we are optimistic that the Army Commander will meet his Phase I goal of 15,500 effective strength, which includes both part-time and full-time Reservists. Phase II of LFRR, however, calls for reaching a personnel strength of 18,500 part-time Reservists. We believe it will be impossible to reach growth targets within the current Reserve budget.
9. The Committee is uncertain how changes to classes of Reserve service described above under Fraser Recommendation #4 could effect the measurement of personnel

strength in the Reserves, and how pay budgets are allocated. Therefore, we intend to examine other elements of the Reserve Force to compare terms of service and employment of Reservists to that of the Army.

## **CONSULTATION AND MONITORING**

### **DECISIONS**

**Fraser Recommendation #9:** Promise consultation with currently serving reserve authorities, including brigade and unit leadership, and other representatives of the broader reserve community, on how to implement these changes, and commit to a phased, prudent process of implementation that will include careful assessment of results and changes to the program as necessary. This should be achieved by simply resurrecting the Command and Area Consultative Working Groups with the same membership. These seemed to work well until the proposal of April 1999 disturbed the trust that had begun to build between NDHQ and the Reserves community.

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**Fraser Recommendation #10:** Monitoring of the implementation of Ministerial decisions arising both out of the SCRR and this report should continue.

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### **STATUS**

The CLS did reconstitute the CCWG in line with this recommendation, and achieved consensus among key stakeholders on first steps to resolve the impasse in LFRR. This group, now referred to by the CLS as the Command Consultative Advisory Group, will continue to act as a sounding board for the CLS, who can rely on the vast experience and judgment of its membership throughout LFRR. Areas have also instituted their own consultative working groups, which is a good step toward fostering a community of interest in Canada's military.

This is the third, but first public, report on LFRR delivered by the MMC since the Policy Statement of October 2000. We have also carried out four Area Consultation sessions, in Calgary, Toronto, Gagetown and Montreal, and continue to communicate the vision for the Army Reserves contained in the Minister's statement of 6 October 2000. We have also been invited to one community forum that addressed the significance of the Militia's "footprint" role, in Brockville, Ontario. When information on these activities becomes available, it is posted on the MMC's Website, [www.frasercom.ca](http://www.frasercom.ca). These consultations, which serve to generate feedback on current activity from the Reserves community, both

serving and non-serving, also enable the MMC to measure the public policy dimension of reserve restructure, as we develop criteria and methodology for our mediation role when decisions are taken.

### OBSERVATIONS

1. Monitoring progress on the Policy Statement has been challenging because the Department has not acknowledged that it stands distinct from the Strategic Plan (i.e., policy vs. implementation). Because the Policy Statement identifies the prerequisites for Phase II of LFRR, we must therefore pursue the task of trying to fit Departmental/CF activity into the Fraser Recommendations, which stand as the public policy standard of measurement for LFRR.
2. Indeed, we are concerned that the public policy basis for LFRR is not being communicated internally by the chain of command. Departmental documents do not convey the Policy Statement's direction that the Fraser Recommendations are the Government's blueprint for LFRR. Rather, the 2001-2002 *Report on Plans and Priorities*, for example, states only that the Minister announced the first phase of the LFRR Strategic Plan.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the Department's Performance Report for fiscal year 1999-2000, released in March 2001, requires clarification. In its section on "Future Challenges", the Report refers not to the mobilization role of the Reserves, but rather that they "have an important role to play in alleviating current operational pressures." This is an inadequate description of the various strategic roles and capabilities provided by the Reserves as laid out in the Policy Statement.
3. As it stands, we are monitoring the Policy Statement of 6 October, while the Army is implementing only a component of the Policy Statement – the Strategic Plan. We are in receipt of no implementation plan for the Policy Statement *per se*, which would have to include an explanation of how the Fraser Recommendations, as the Government's blueprint for LFRR, will be addressed in Phase II. Many areas of the Policy Statement are not within the authority of the CLS to implement. These include national mobilization planning (VCDS), conditional enrolment (ADM (HR-Mil) and JAG), recruitment and terms of service (also HR-Mil) and CDS reporting on the state of the Reserves. Indeed, most of the Fraser Recommendations do not fall solely under the purview of the CLS. It would appear to be beyond the scope of the actions outlined in the Strategic Plan to deal with these other corporate matters.
4. While the Army provides information on its LFRR Website related to Strategic Plan activity, it does not track progress on the Fraser Recommendations. This should be a corporate responsibility. In the past, the Department has provided regular updates under "Key Reports" on the VCDS Website on progress made on all of the reforms being monitored by the Committee. These reports identify those charged with particular responsibilities to implement Ministerial decisions (Offices of Primary Interests). Such a matrix, drawing attention to the connection between Departmental

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<sup>4</sup> Department of National Defence, *Report on Plans and Priorities*, 2001-2002, p. 115.



activity and the Policy Statement (i.e., the “Fraser Recommendations”) would provide a good tool for internal and external communications, and would keep activity on track with Government direction.

5. The effects of this apparent disconnection between the Minister’s direction and departmental activity have been minimal to date. They will, however, become more apparent and troublesome as we approach Phase II of LFRR. The Department should address this issue as quickly as possible in order to keep the policy-implementation continuum intact.

### **COMMUNITY FOOTPRINT: DEFINING THE ROLE FOR THE CF RESERVES**

*“Located in communities throughout Canada, the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the raison d’être of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a “footprint” in communities across the country. Its significant social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.”*

The Honourable Art Eggleton  
Minister of National Defence  
October 2000

The Army Reserves have long been tasked with the role of maintaining a military “footprint” across the country. The Minister of National Defence, as can be seen above in the statement from the Government of Canada’s Policy Statement to guide LFRR, has made it clear that revitalizing the Army Reserves must not occur at the expense of this “footprint”. Canadians who know Reservists as neighbours, colleagues or friends understand that part-time military personnel exist in their communities. Canadians in both rural and urban communities see armouries, soldiers, exercises and, on occasion, soldiers engaged in domestic operations.

The Policy Statement confirmed that deciding the breadth and depth of the “footprint” remains a matter of public policy. It is, in that sense, a mandated role for the Reserves within which LFRR must proceed. That is clear enough. What, however, does the public expect of the military in general, and the Army Reserves in particular? What value do Canadians place on the part-time military? What types of local capability do part-time military personnel and armouries provide? How do Militia units fit into the social fabric of their communities?

These are the types of questions the Committee brought to small groups in Calgary, Toronto, Gagetown and Montreal in the past year. We will continue to do so.

The response to the Committee's "community footprint" sessions has been remarkably productive across the country. The Committee and, we are sure, the participants, would especially like to thank the following distinguished members of Canada's military and defence community for acting as facilitators at our sessions: Dr. David J. Bercuson (Calgary); Dr. Ron Haycock (Toronto); Dr. Marc Milner (Gagetown) and MGen (ret'd) Clive Addy (Montreal).

Participants have included Members of Parliament, Senators, businessmen and women, academics, municipal politicians, students, honorary appointments and other interested Canadians. A list of participants is attached as Annex B.

The groups were requested to provide comments on various topics related to the "community footprint", such as the place of armouries and military personnel in communities, the role of the Reserves in local emergency preparedness and the relationship of part-time military service to citizenship and Canada's social fabric.

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The following summaries of consultations are provided on our Website. They are being reproduced here in point form to represent the many dimensions of the military's footprint in Canadian communities, and the mixture of strategic, operational, geographical, economic, social and political considerations that must be considered to keep it viable.

1. The participants offered a number of suggestions to improve the public's knowledge of the military in local communities. For example, Land Force Western Area has developed outreach programs that help the Army to educate Canadians about the military. Wearing of uniforms in public, increased presence of the military on university and college campuses and recognition through, for instance, workplace literature of deserving CF personnel are some common-sense options.
2. Furthermore, honorary appointments, which tend to be prominent community members, form an excellent bridge between the military and civilian society. Some concern was raised that delays in the appointments process are compromising that role in many units.
3. Armouries serve the CF and communities well, but could benefit by more local control of their use for non-military functions. Such use could serve to broaden public knowledge of the military, and enhance awareness of the armoury as a focal point for the community both in times of peace and emergency, either domestic or abroad. Communities could also help their local units and armouries by reconsidering taxation assumptions related to CF properties.

4. There was a general sense of frustration with the restrictions placed on armoury use. Creative and co-operative solutions for modernizing our concept of armouries as a focal point of community activity are possible, but too often face resistance from regulatory controls. It was also pointed out that demographic changes have resulted in a shift of population centres from downtown cores where armouries remain. Some local governments have devised ways to alleviate the cost of armouries, but heavy payments in lieu of taxes demanded by municipalities have an enormous impact on Area budgets.
5. Enhancing the public's knowledge and awareness of the military is not, of course, an end in itself. Increased awareness of the military also serves to solidify the sense of ownership Canadians have of the institution. That may, in turn, help Canadians to associate themselves more closely with local units as focal points for emergency preparedness and related security functions. In general, the participants applauded a more prominent role for the Reserves in disaster reaction and relief. There is perhaps too little information in the public domain about the intricacies of emergency preparedness at the local level. The public seems to have little sense of the administrative and legal complexities surrounding the issue, and more public debate may be desirable. Given the abundance of scientific data pointing to the increased risk of natural disasters, clarifying the role of the Reserves, and even the CF generally, in preparing for them and reacting to them is a timely issue.
6. Canadians need to understand the rationale for the Militia's role of providing a framework to expand our military capability if required. Some participants expressed grave reservations that current planning did not adequately account for many of the requirements of mobilization, such as immediate action units and the commitment of troops to support critical infrastructure. It was argued that requirements far exceed the resources available in both the Regular and Reserve Forces. Plans which identify vital points of interest and how to protect them if threatened should not, it was argued, be an overwhelming task if the workload was distributed widely, made a priority and supported by an appropriate force structure. It was also noted, however, that the business of providing defence capability on an ongoing basis was already having a heavy impact on serving CF personnel. The CF had an obligation, it was contended, to balance "footprint" and mobilization concepts with training, equipping and building cohesion for operations.
7. While the *raison d'être* of the reserve force to provide the framework for national mobilization remains valid, for what threats would the Canadian Forces require such expansion? While many Canadians might expect the Army Reserves to provide the framework for critical infrastructure protection (CIP), would such a role detract from its combat capability? Many in the group recalled the civil defence role of the Militia from the late 1950s, and bristled at the notion of repeating a move that sapped the Militia of units, personnel and esprit de corps.
8. The structure and organization to provide a national CIP capability currently exists in the Army Reserves, and change should not be applied simply to respond to short-term



exigencies. More imaginative and coordinated use of the civilian skills of Reservists would be a low cost way to contribute to “local capability”. Regardless, general-purpose combat training remains the fundamental requirement for whatever roles are assigned to the Reserves. Moreover, the Supplementary Reserves, consisting of retired CF personnel with significant training and experience, remain a largely untapped resource in the area of critical infrastructure protection.

9. The legislative framework surrounding critical infrastructure protection is also very complex. Federal, provincial and municipal governments all have a hand in various levels of CIP. Emergency Measures organizations, police and fire departments and health authorities already have roles to play in dealing with domestic security, emergencies and disasters. The newly created Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection within the Department of National Defence is tasked to deal with this issue from a national perspective.
10. The Army Reserves are not the only element of the CF that provides a “footprint”. Cadets, Rangers and Junior Rangers, the Naval and Air Reserves and the Supplementary Reserves also fill that role. In the limited areas where they are located, Regular Forces also provide a “footprint”. Indeed, one participant pointed out that all CF members as well as those associated with the military act as ambassadors for the CF.
11. This is a salient point that the Committee has always supported. The Minister’s identification of the Reserves’ social role in fostering good citizenship is perhaps one not easily measured, other than in terms of the number of Canadians who have served, who are serving and will serve the country – full or part-time.
12. As a hybrid social/military institution, Reserve units contribute both to the social fabric of communities and the military capabilities of the nation. One suggestion was made that reserve units often reflect the diversity of those communities through the presence of visible minorities and women in greater numbers than can be found in the Regular Force. That said, much work remains to be done in increasing public awareness and knowledge of the functions and roles of the Reserves. Several participants argued that young Canadians would continue to be attracted to the Reserves for traditional reasons. However, the CF needs to do a better job of competing against other avenues available to youth who face unprecedented educational demands and costs. In many ways, the military as a teaching institution can do much to shape tomorrow’s citizens by facilitating education, self-confidence, leadership and management skills.
13. Several comments were made about the social role of the Reserves and the contribution of military service to national unity and citizenship. Many participants pointed to the great success of the Cadet movement, and its connection to reserve units and infrastructure across the country. The importance of maintaining a military presence in all communities, big and small, is indisputable given the “footprint” requirement for the Reserves, but some concern was raised over the cost of armouries

in isolated locations that train insufficient numbers of soldiers. That said, even the visibility of reservists in communities is compromised by the practice of centralized training. More local training made visible to the community would raise the profile of military service, and ensure that Canadians were made more aware of their military.

## **ANNEX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE AND POLICY STATEMENT**

October 2000

### **Terms of Reference**

The Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces was first established in the Fall of 1997. Following the publication of reports in 1998 and 1999, the Committee was reconstituted and mandated to continue monitoring the implementation of government approved recommendations related to Reserves and Professional Development, Education and Leadership. It is anticipated that the Committee will report again on these matters by the end of the current year. In addition to the monitoring role, the Chair of the Committee, the Hon. John A. Fraser, was requested to provide the Minister with specific advice on the process for the restructuring of the Reserves (LFRR). That report "*In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*" was presented in June of this year.

The Minister's reform endeavour continues with his decision to prolong the Monitoring Committee's mandate to allow for the ongoing monitoring of the implementation of the *Fraser Report* recommendations. The Committee will now also include Major General Reginald Lewis (Retired).

The following Terms of Reference have been defined for the Committee Members:

1. The role of the Committee is to ensure that the recommendations of the *Fraser Report* are implemented in keeping with the Minister's Policy Statement on Reserves Restructuring (LFRR).

- The Committee will monitor the LFRR Implementation Plan and provide quarterly progress reports to the Minister, the CDS and the DM
- The Committee will liaise with the Reserves community and the CLS throughout the restructuring process to ensure that the exercise is conducted in as open and transparent a manner as possible
- The Committee will also act as mediators should any issue arise which would create a potential impasse in the implementation
- The Committee will have access to all relevant information and may meet and/or visit any individuals and locations which they deem necessary in their review
- The Committee will be served by a Secretariat providing administrative, research and analytical support as required.

2. The CLS will provide a step-by-step plan and critical path for each recommendation which the Committee will use as a focus for their review. He will also



identify any OPIs whom he tasks with specific responsibilities and with whom the Committee may liaise as required.

3. In addition to the quarterly reports to the MND, the CDS and the DM, the Committee will provide the Reserves community with a semi-annual report on the progress of implementation of LFRR.

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### **GOVERNMENT OF CANADA POLICY STATEMENT** **LAND FORCE RESERVE RESTRUCTURE (LFRR)**

I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and express my appreciation for the many individuals and organizations who have worked so hard to get us to the point where we can move forward in the LFRR process. The late Chief Justice Brian Dickson, Dr Jack Granatstein and LGen Charles Belzile (ret'd) began the current process in 1995 with the Special Commission on Reserve Restructure. The Defence Team, particularly the Land Staff, worked thereafter for many years to evaluate the Army Reserve in order to implement the recommendations of the SCRR. The knowledge and experience gained in that exercise have been of invaluable assistance to those doing recent work on the policy and institutional parameters for reserve restructure. The Hon. John A. Fraser and the members of the Minister's Monitoring Committee, D. Bevis Dewar and Dr. David Bercuson, have monitored progress on reserve restructure. At my request, they have also provided me with advice on how to deal with the impasse reached last year in consultations between the Army and the reserve community. LGen Mike Jeffery, also at my request, consulted widely in search of common ground among the stakeholders that would provide us with the ability to launch LFRR. These individuals, along with Departmental and CF staff, have wrestled this very complex problem of reserve restructure to the ground. Having reached common ground among stakeholders, I am pleased to re-affirm current Government policy and begin implementation of LFRR.

The Army Reserve is a vital component of Canada's military capability. Indeed, the Defence Mission requires the cooperation of both the Regular and Reserve components of the Canadian Forces. Located in communities throughout Canada, the Army Reserves exist primarily to provide the framework for expansion should the need arise. This is the *raison d'être* of our Reserve Force, which is characterized by its role as a "footprint" in communities across the country. Its significant social role of fostering the values of citizenship and public service is one which, as Canadians, we have come to cherish and must protect.

However, Army Reservists also help us to augment our Regular high readiness forces when committed to operations. Since the end of the Cold War, our reliance on these augmentees has increased due to the high tempo of our operational activity. We aim now to have Reservists provide up to 20% of the personnel for these deployments. The Army Reserves are even more prominent in our defence against natural disasters and local emergencies, such as the Saguenay and Red River floods and the Ice Storm of 1998.

The Fraser Report and LGen Jeffery's Strategic Plan for LFRR are the key ingredients to the success of this process. The recommendations of the Fraser Report will serve as the Government's blueprint for LFRR, and LGen Jeffery's Plan will be the first step in their implementation. This strategic plan provides for fixing some of the problems plaguing the Militia identified in the Fraser Report. It will lay the groundwork for developing future policies to fit the lives of our part-time citizen soldiers. We need them more now than at any time since the Second World War. They provide the framework for expansion should we require mobilization of forces; for individual and unit augmentation on peace support operations; and, to represent the military footprint in communities across the country. The Strategic Plan, combined with some additional actions I am taking, will ensure that the CF Reserves will continue to be both operationally sound, while contributing to the development of citizenship and to local emergency preparedness.

These actions are taken to clarify public policy as it relates to the Army Reserves and to facilitate the timely and effective implementation of LFRR. Specifically, they include:

- Increasing the number of part-time Army Reservists to at least 18,500 by the end of fiscal year 2005/06;
- Further consideration of national mobilization planning;
- The appointment of a senior official to manage LFRR;
- The appointment of the Hon. John A. Fraser and MGen Reginald Lewis (ret'd) to monitor LFRR;
- Clarify the authority and role of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets.

These measures demonstrate our commitment to an open and transparent process that will facilitate the participation of the broader reserves community, and the Canadian public, in developing a citizen soldiery ready for the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Restructure will proceed, and succeed, only with co-operation among the key stakeholders. We have therefore taken a prudent, cautious approach to reserve restructure. As a national institution and a valuable strategic resource serving communities throughout the country, the Militia is synonymous with Canada's proud military heritage. This legacy will remain and be protected as restructuring moves forward. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, reserve restructure will continue to include the advice and engagement of key stakeholders. These decisions, along with my recent announcement of the expansion of the Canadian Ranger and Junior Canadian Ranger programs, demonstrate the Government's support for our part-time Reservists, and confirms that the CF's presence will continue to be felt across the country.

## **ANNEX B – MMC CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES**

The Minister's Monitoring Committee pursues its information gathering in several ways including discrete research and interviews. For its mandate, pertaining to LFRR, the Committee also uses consultation as a valuable source of insight, ideas and verification. Our consultations on the Army's structure in Canada will take place in the four areas: Land Force Western Area, Land Force Central Area, Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre and Land Force Atlantic Area.

In 2001, consultations have been held in:

- Calgary, 15 March 2001
- Toronto, 19 April 2001
- Gagetown, 20-21 September 2001
- Montreal, 18 October 2001

Visit our Website at [www.frasercom.ca](http://www.frasercom.ca) to learn more about the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee consultation activities.

### **LIST OF PARTICIPANTS**

<i>NAME</i>	<i>ORGANIZATION</i>
Addy, MGen (r) Clive	FMUSIC and MMC Facilitator for the Montreal Consultations
Allard, Maj Richard	CFB Bagotville
Anderson, HCol J.R.	14 (Calgary) Service Battalion
Archambault, Dr. Peter	Director of Research, MMC
Armour, Mr. W.	CF Liaison Council
Bailey, CWO	RSM, 36 Canadian Brigade Group
Bata, Sonja	CF Liaison Council
Belleau, BGen D.	Deputy Area Commander, SQFT
Belzile, LGen (r) Charles	Conference of Defence Associations
Bercuson, Dr. David	Member, MMC
Bertrand, LCol (r) François	Montreal Cadet Detachment
Blakely, Col Sam	Calgary Museums Society
Boisclair, CWO R.	35 Brigade School
Bolton, LCol Bruce	CO, The Black Watch (RHR)
Boucher, BGen (r) Pierre	HCol, Régiment de Maisonneuve
Brough, Col William	Director of Army Training
Brown, Mr. Michael	Team Leader Product Development, Calgary Inc.
Bruneau, LCol Pierre	Deputy Commander, 35 Canadian Brigade Group
Byers, Ms. Fran	First Nations Disaster Services Officer, Alberta Disaster Service
Cameron, BGen (r) Peter	Co-Chair, Reserves 2000
Cameron, CWO R.	20 <sup>th</sup> Field Regiment
Caron, BGen M.	Area Commander, SQFT
Carr, Mr. J.	MLA, Oromocto-Gagetown
Catto, HCol John	709 (Toronto) Communications Regiment
Champagne, Mr. Michel	Emergency Measures, SPIM
Chapman, Col R.J.	CO, 33 Canadian Brigade Group
Charters, Dr. D.	UNB, Centre for Conflict Studies



Chénier, Mr. Stéphane  
 Clayton, CWO J.  
 Clowater, Insp. S.R.  
 Collins, CWO G.F.  
 Cook, Mrs. Sheila-Marie  
 Cruickshank, WO A.  
 Danson, Hon. Barnett J.  
 De Gaust, Mr. Kevin  
 DesLauriers, Col R.W.  
 Desmarteau, Mr. Leo  
 Dewar, Mr. D. Bev  
 Dorfman, LCol Jeff  
 Doyle, LCol J.S.  
 Duffett, Mr. Bill  
 Duke, LCol J.T.R.  
 Dunbar, CWO G.F.  
 Dwyer, The Rev. D.F.  
 Ellis, LCol James  
 Elms, LCol R.G.  
 Ervin, LCdr Michael  
 Fagan, LCdr L.  
 Farrelly, Dr. Robert  
 Fitch, MGeneral E.S.  
 Forrestall, Sen. M.  
 Fournier, Mr. Léonard  
 Fraser, Col David  
 Fraser, Hon. John A.  
 Gaasenbeek, Matthew  
 Gagnon, Maj A.  
 Gagnon, BGen Robin  
 Gauthier, BGen J.C. Michel  
 Giacomini, Maj R.D.  
 Giberson, Mr. R.  
 Gibson, Col John  
 Gillespie, Col Gregory  
 Grandy, LCol P.A.  
 Grant, LCdr A.  
 Grant, Mr. Dale  
 Grant, BGen (r) J.  
 Grant, LCol J.R.  
 Gray, Col (Ret'd) Ian  
 Gray, Mr. Robert J.  
 Green, Maj Bill  
 Green, Mr. Doug  
 Grondin, Col J.M.  
 Gutteridge, Ms. Pamela  
 Halfper, Col A.  
 Halikowski, BGen Don  
 Hamel, Col C.S.  
 Hanaford, Mr.  
 Hanson, HLCol Jim  
 Harbour, LCol Claude  
 Haycock, Dr. Ron  
 Hayter, HLCol John  
 Heard, Steven  
 Henderson, LCdr J.

Service des sports, loisirs et du développement social  
 NB Command, Royal Canadian Legion  
 Fredericton Police Force  
 RSM, 2 Bn NS Highrs (CB)  
 Executive Director, MMC  
 Militia Training Detachment Calgary  
 Former Minister of National Defence  
 Special Assistant to Minister of National Defence, Ottawa  
 CO, 32 Canadian Brigade Group  
 Executive Director, CF Liaison Council  
 Member, MMC  
 Deputy Commander, 32 Canadian Brigade Group  
 CO, 45<sup>th</sup> Field Engineer Squadron  
 Director of Facilities Management, S.A.I.T.  
 CO, 8<sup>th</sup> Canadian Hussars  
 RSM, 1 Bn NS Highrs (N)  
 HCol, Royal Montreal Regiment  
 CO, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Cdns)  
 CO, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada  
 CO, HMCS Tecumseh  
 Cadets Training Officer, HMCS Quadra  
 RCMI Defence Studies Committee  
 Invited as Area Commander, LFWA and then as PM, LFRR  
 Senator  
  
 Project Director, LFRR  
 Chairman, MMC  
 RCMI Defence Studies Committee  
 Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre, Montreal  
 Commandant, CFC Toronto  
 Area Commander, LFCA  
 CO, 35 Med Coy  
 Mayor, Oromocto  
 Military Institute of Windsor  
 CO, 38 Canadian Brigade Group  
 CO, 1 Bn R Nfld R  
 CO, HMCS Donnacona  
 Managing Editor, Defence Policy Review  
 HColonel  
 CO, 1 Bn NS Highrs (N)  
 Executive Director, Museum of the Regiments  
 Command President, The Royal Canadian Legion, AB/NWT  
 CO, Saskatchewan Dragoons  
 Executive Vice Chairman, FMUSIC  
 CO, 35 Canadian Brigade Group  
 Special Assistant to the Minister of National Defence, Toronto Office  
 CO, 31 Canadian Brigade Group  
 Deputy Area Commander, LFCA  
 CO, 41 Canadian Brigade Group  
 Calgary Herald  
 25 Service Battalion  
 CO, 52<sup>e</sup> Compagnie médicale  
 Royal Military College and MMC Facilitator for the Toronto Consultations  
 Grey and Simcoe Foresters Regiment  
 University of Calgary, Military History Department Student  
 CO, HMCS Brunswick

Hole, HCol Harry	15 (Edmonton) Service Battalion
Holmes, Mr. Wayne	President, Naval Museum of Alberta
Hook, LCol Ray	Alumni Relations, S.A.I.T.
Horrocks, Mr. David	Public Relations, Royal Canadian Legion, AB/NWT
Hubel, HLCol Jim	7 Toronto Regiment
Huebert, Dr. Rob	Dept of Political Science, U of Calgary
Hughes, HLCol Paul	Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
Istvanffy, Mr. James	Executive Assistant to Rob Anders, MP
Iversen, HLCol John	The Royal Regiment of Canada
Jackman, HCol H.N.R.	Governor General's Horse Guards
Jakubiec, Maj D.M.	CO, Meaford Area Training Centre
Jobin, Mr. Marcel	HCol, Voltigeurs de Québec
Judd, LCol Chris	CO, 1 <sup>st</sup> Hussars
Kelly, Senator Bill	HLColonel, 2 Field Engineer Regiment
Kirby, C de L	BGeneral (ret'd)
Lachance, LCol Jacques	CO, Canadian Grenadier Guards
Laflamme, Mr. Guy	CF Liaison Council
Lamontagne, Mr. Gilles	President, RMC Board of Governor
Lelièvre, LCol	G1, LFAA HQ
Lennard, HCol Gordon	Calgary Honourary Colonel Representation
Leppard, Mr. Thomas	Assistant Principal, John G. Diefenbaker High School, Calgary
Lewis, MGen (r) Reginald	Member, MMC
Lockhart, Mr. B.	Phoenix Communications
Logan, Hon. R.E.	HColonel
Luker, MWO R.B.	RSM, 35 Med Coy
Lund, LCol Joseph	CF Liaison Council
MacCabe, LCol J.M.	CO, 31 Service Battalion
MacCallum, LCol G.R.	CO, 2 Bn NS Highrs (CB)
MacDonald, Col (r) Brian	Chair, Atlantic Council of Canada
MacDonald, Ms. Marian	Army Cadet League of Ontario
MacDonald, LCol W.A.	CO, 33 Service Battalion
MacGillivray, LCol E.A.	CO, 1 Bn RNBR
MacLean, CWO M.H.	RSM, 37 Canadian Brigade Group
MacLeod, Col B.W.	CO, 3 ASG Gagetown
MacPherson, Dr. Nelson	University of Calgary, Military History Department Observer
Mariage, MGen Frédérick	Retired
Martin, Hon. Judge F.	HLCol, Royal Canadian Hussars
Martin, Maj J.J.	CO, 14 (Calgary) Service Battalion
Massé, Maj Pierre	CO, Compagnie d'instruction (Farnham)
McAlpine, LGen Duncan	HCol, The Black Watch (RHR)
McAuley, Maj David	CO, 33 Field Engineer Squadron
McDougall, HLCol John	8 <sup>th</sup> Field Engineer Regiment
McEachern, LCol B.	CO, Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
McEwen, Cdr Hugh	HMCS York
McKelvey, Mr. N.	HLColonel
McKenna, Mr. John	Royal Canadian Military Institute
Meisner, Col E.K.	CO, 36 Canadian Brigade Group
Meisner, Maj	SO FD, LFAA HQ
Merrithew, Hon. G.	Reserves 2000
Millar, BGen (r) Bob	Reserves 2000
Milne, LCol John (Jay)	CO, The King's Own Calgary Regiment
Milner, MGen (r) Clive	Colonel Commandant (ret'd) (RCAC)
Milner, Dr. M.	UNB and MMC Facilitator for the Gagetown Consultations
Mitchell, BGen G.B.	Area Commander, LFAA
Mitton, Mr. L.	Councillor, City of Moncton
Mombourquette, Mr. F.	NS Command, Royal Canadian Legion

Moore, Mr. Sherrold	Vice President, Finance, The Calgary Chamber of Commerce
Mouatt, LCol Colin	Area Land Force Restructure
Murray, Col (r) J.D.	HColonel
Murray, Mr. Robert	CF Liaison Council
Mussolum, LCol Michael	CO, 20 Field Regiment RCA
Nadeau, LCol Robert	CO, Régiment de Maisonneuve
O'Brien, LCol Gary	Deputy Commander, 31 Canadian Brigade Group
Parsons, Col R.	ACOS, LFAA
Pépin, Hon. Lucie	Senator
Perry, CWO J.	ARSM, LFAA
Préfontaine, Col M.A.	CO, 34 Canadian Brigade Group
Price, Mr. David	MP, Compton-Stanstead
Pryer, HCol Don	Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
Ring, BGen E.P.	Deputy Area Commander, LFAA
Robertson, LCol A.F.	Chief of Staff, 33 Canadian Brigade Group
Robertson, Mr. Donald R.	Royal Canadian Legion – QC Command
Robinson, Col M.W.	CO, 37 Canadian Brigade Group
Rogers, HLCol Winston	Brockville Rifles
Roi, Dr. Michael	University of Toronto
Rushton, CWO T.D.	RSM, 33 Service Battalion
Santerre, Ms. Sylvie	Croix-rouge - Montreal
Selkirk, LCol (r) John	Reserves 2000
Senkiew, MCpl M.	41 Canadian Brigade Group
Shaw, Mr. R.	Detective Inspector, OPP
Skaling, Mr. A.	Director, Emergency Measures Organization
Smith, Col (r) D.	HColonel
St-Pierre, Ms. Anik	Croix-rouge - Montreal
Stafford, LCol G.	CO, Royal Regiment of Canada
Stapleford, Ms. D.	Cadet Instructor Cadre
Ste-Marie, CWO P.	CTC Gagetown
Stephenson, Mercedes	University of Calgary, Military History Department Student
Tabbemor, BGen D.	Deputy Commander, LFWA
Taillon, Dr. Paul de B	Adjunct Professor, RMC
Tardif, LCol Stéphane	CO, Les Fusiliers du Saint-Laurent
Thompson, Mr. G.	MP, NB Southwest
Thomson, BGen (r) G.	Workman's Compensation Board
Trent, HCol P.F.	Mayor, Westmount
Troicuk, Maj G.W.	2 Bn NS Highrs (CB)
Turtle, Dr. John	Psychology Department, Ryerson U.
Van der Schee, LCol Wyn	Alberta Militia Society
Vance, LCol J.	2 RCR
Ward, Col M.	CO, CTC Gagetown
Ward, Lt Sally	Junior Canadian Ranger Officer
Wayne, Mrs. E.	MP, Saint John
Wesson, LCol Ernie	FMUSIC
White, LCol (r) B.	Dominion Command, Royal Canadian Legion
Wilfert, Mr. Bryon	MP, Oak Ridges
Williams, LCol Rick	Chairman of the Board, Museum of the Regiments
Williamson, LCol	CO, B.C. Dragoons
Wilson, Dr. B.	UNB, Centre for Conflict Studies
Wilson, Capt (N) Ret'd W.H.	Chairman, Naval Museum of Alberta
Wolfe, HCol J.J.	3 Field Engineer Regiment
Wonderham, CWO Peter	RSM, 41 Canadian Brigade Group
Wood, Mr. Bob	MP, Nipissing
Young, Mr. George	Executive Assistant, Minister of National Defence
Zsolnay, Mr. Tamás	Concordia University



## *ANNEX C – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS*

ADM (HR-Mil)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military)
CCWG	Command Consultative Working Group
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFRG	Canadian Forces Recruiting Group
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CLS	Chief of the Land Staff
COs	Commanding Officers
Comms	Communications
COTC	Canadian Officer Training Corps
DGHS	Director General Health Services
DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
FY	Fiscal Year
JAG	Judge Advocate General
LFAA	Land Force Atlantic Area
LFCA	Land Force Central Area
LFRR	Land Force Reserve Restructure
LFWA	Land Force Western Area
LGen	Lieutenant-General
LLS	Limited Liability Service
MGen	Major-General
MITCP	Militia Individual Training & Career Profile
MND	Minister of National Defence
MMC	Minister's Monitoring Committee
NavRes	Naval Reserve
NBCD	Nuclear Biological Chemical Defense
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters

OPI	Office of Primary Interest
PMO	Project Management Office
PRL	Primary Reserve List
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RESO	Reserve Entry Scheme for Officers
SCRR	Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves
SQFT	<i>Secteur du Québec de la Force terrestre</i>
ULS	Unlimited Liability Service
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff

## **ANNEX D – BIOGRAPHIES**

### **THE HONOURABLE JOHN A. FRASER CHAIRMAN**

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John Allen Fraser, P.C., O.C., O.B.C., C.D., Q.C., was born December 15, 1931, in Japan and raised and educated in British Columbia. He was called to the Bar in 1954 and practiced law until his election to the House of Commons in 1972. He was re-elected in 1974, 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1988. In opposition he served as critic on Environment, Labour, Post Office, Solicitor General and Fisheries matters. He was Minister of Environment and Postmaster General (1979-80), and then Minister of Fisheries (1984-85).

In 1986, Mr. Fraser became the first Speaker of the House of Commons to be elected by secret ballot by members of parliament. He served as Speaker until February 1994. His accomplishments as Speaker include the establishment of the Central and Eastern European Parliamentary Cooperation Program; the creation of the House of Commons Public Information Office; and the establishment of the House of Commons environmental program, Greening the Hill. In 1986, he established a House of Commons Task Force on the Disabled and Handicapped to ensure access and employment opportunities on Parliament Hill for the disadvantaged. He also commissioned the recent publication, *The House of Commons at Work*.

Over the years, Mr. Fraser has had a continuing interest in resource matters including fisheries and forestry and has demonstrated a profound commitment to environmental causes both as a lawyer and a parliamentarian. He has received a variety of national awards for his valuable contributions and tireless efforts in the area of sustainable development. In addition to these many awards, he has been active with a number of boards and foundations, and was awarded an honorary professorship from the Beijing Medical University (China) in 1992.

In 1994, Mr. Fraser was appointed Canada's Ambassador for the Environment, a position held until September, 1998. In 1995, in recognition of his many contributions to Canada, he was awarded the Order of Canada. He is also a member of the Order of British Columbia and holds the Canadian Forces Decoration. He continues to be active in environmental protection and resource conservation and was appointed Chair of the Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council in September 1998.

Mr. Fraser has been associated with the Canadian Forces since 1950, when he first enlisted as a private soldier with the West Coast Signal Regiment. After two years with Canadian Officer Training Corps, he was commissioned as an infantry officer and posted to Germany in 1953 with the First Canadian Highland Battalion of the 27th Brigade. From 1954 to 1962, he served as an officer in both the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada and the Canadian Scottish Regiment. Mr. Fraser was appointed Honorary Lieutenant-



Colonel, the Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, in 1994 and is currently the Regiment's Honorary Colonel.

In October 1997, Mr. Fraser was appointed a member of the National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change. He is currently Chair.

#### **DR. DAVID J. BERCUSON**

##### **MEMBER**

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David Bercuson was born in Montreal in August, 1945. He attended Sir George Williams University, graduating in June 1966 with Honours in History and winning the Lieutenant-Governor's Silver Medal for the highest standing in history. Bercuson pursued graduate studies at the University of Toronto, earning an MA in history in 1967 and a Ph.D. in 1971.

Dr. Bercuson has published widely in academic and popular publications on a wide range of topics. He specializes in modern Canadian politics, Canadian defence and foreign policy, and Canadian military history. He has written, coauthored, or edited over 25 popular and academic books and does political commentary for CBC and CTV television. He has written regular columns for the *Globe & Mail*, the *Financial Post* and other newspapers.

In 1988 Bercuson was elected to the Royal Society of Canada and in May, 1989, he was appointed Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies at The University of Calgary. Since January 1997 he has been Director of the Strategic Studies Program at the University of Calgary.

His book, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia*, won the Wilfred Eggleston Award for nonfiction at the Alberta Book Awards in May 1997. Another recent book, *Deadly Seas: The Story of the St. Croix, U305 and the Battle of the Atlantic*, coauthored with Dr. Holger Herwig, was on the *Maclean's* Bestseller list for several weeks. His most recent books *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War* was published in September, 1999 and *The Patricias* was published in May 2001. His new book, *Bismarck!*, co-authored with Holger Herwig, was published in New York and Toronto in the fall of 2001.

Dr. Bercuson was appointed Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence on the Future of the Canadian Forces from January to April 1997.

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**MR. DANIEL B. DEWAR**  
**MEMBER**

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Bevis Dewar was born in Kenmore, Ontario in August 1932. He studied at Queen's University where he obtained an Honours Bachelor of Arts degree in history, economics and political science in 1953, following which he pursued postgraduate studies in Canadian history also at Queen's.

In 1954, he joined the Public Service of Canada and was appointed to the Cabinet Secretariat in the Privy Council Office where he was secretary to Cabinet committees dealing with matters of interdepartmental liaison and policy development, mainly regarding external affairs and defence.

In 1963, he became a program analyst in the Treasury Board Secretariat. His duties consisted of program and expenditure budget analysis and of presenting recommendations dealing with defence production, industrial development, foreign affairs and defence. In 1968, he was named Assistant Secretary of the Program Branch at the Treasury Board Secretariat, responsible for analyzing and making recommendations on expenditure budgets of all federal departments. The following year he became Deputy Secretary of the same Branch.

Mr. Dewar was appointed Assistant Deputy Minister, Medical Services Branch, Health and Welfare Canada in September 1973. From September, 1975 to August 1979, he served as Assistant Secretary for the Government Branch of Science and Technology Canada, responsible for the International Division, the Government Projects Division, and the Project Review and Assessment Division.

In August 1979, Mr. Dewar was appointed Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Operations) in the Privy Council Office. He was responsible for secretariats on economic policy, government operations, foreign affairs and defence, native and social affairs, communications, emergency planning, labour relations, and legislation and House planning. From November 1982 to May 1989, Mr. Dewar served as Deputy Minister of National Defence. He was appointed Associate Secretary of the Cabinet and Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council in May 1989. In October, 1990, he was named Principal of the Canadian Centre for Management Development.

Mr. Dewar retired from public service in August 1992. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute on Governance and served as its Chairman from 1992 to 1997.

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**MAJOR GENERAL (RET'D) REGINALD W. LEWIS**  
**MEMBER**

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Major General Reginald W. Lewis, C.M., C.M.M., C.D., was born in London, England and was raised and educated in the United Kingdom. He became a Certified General Accountant in 1962 and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries and Administrators in 1965. General Lewis is presently Special Advisor to the Minister of National Defence. He also served as Chairman of the Honourary Colonels' Council of Canada. In October 2000, General Lewis was named a member of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces Phase III which focuses on the monitoring of Land Force Reserve Restructure.

General Lewis' military career began when he joined his school's Cadet Corps. He joined the British Army in 1948 and served in the Royal Army Ordnance Corps in the U.K., Egypt, Turkey, Greece and Eritrea. In 1954 he came to Canada and joined the militia and subsequently commanded the Toronto Service Battalion, Toronto Militia District, Central Militia Area – the largest command in the Reserves – before being appointed Special Project Officer Reserves, NDHQ. Thereafter, he was made Chief of Reserves. Relinquishing the appointment of CRes in 1988, he became the International President of the Interallied Confederation of Reserves Officers of NATO (CIOR), an organization based at NATO H.Q. in Brussels, representing 800,000 Reserve Officers of the Alliance. Subsequent to the Presidency of CIOR he was appointed the Honourary Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Canada.

Over the years, General Lewis has continued to have an active involvement in civilian matters. Among his many accomplishments, he has been President of the Parking Authority of Toronto, Chairman and CEO of the Toronto Economic Development Corporation, and Chairman of Defence Construction Canada Ltd. Recently, he was appointed a Director of Parc Downsview Park, Inc. and he has served as a judge of the Citizenship Court.

General Lewis has also been extensively involved in community and military associations throughout his career. A member of the Board of Trade of Toronto, he is the Chair of its Military Affairs Committee. He has been Chairman of the Toronto and Region Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations as well as President of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Association and of the Canadian Forces Logistics Association.

General Lewis has received numerous orders and decorations throughout his career. Included among them are the Canadian Forces Decoration (three clasps) (CD); the Commemorative Plaque, City of Amsterdam; Member, Order of Canada (CM), Commander Order of Military Merit (CMM), and Commander, Order of St. John (CStJ).



**SHEILA-MARIE COOK**  
**EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

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Sheila-Marie Cook is an experienced strategic planner and communications consultant who has managed the operations of a number of Royal Commissions, Federal and Provincial Government Inquiries and Public Policy Reviews. Mrs. Cook holds degrees in History and Economics and has served as the Executive Director of the Minister of National Defence's Monitoring Committee on Change since April 1998.

**DR. PETER ARCHAMBAULT**  
**RESEARCH DIRECTOR**

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Peter Archambault holds a B.A. and M.A. in History from the University of New Brunswick, and a Ph.D. in Military History, from the University of Calgary. His research areas include defence economics, civil-military relation and alliance politics since 1945. In addition to his work for the Monitoring Committee, Dr. Archambault is an Adjunct Associate Professor of War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada.

**Secretariat**

Isabelle Dumas, Coordinator of Research and Information Services  
Joan Gallagher, Receptionist  
Anne Hooper, Librarian and Research Assistant  
Suzanne Schryer-Belair, Senior Administrative Officer







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